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Since its introduction in 1916, the estate tax has been one of the most controversial parts of the 
United States tax code.
Estate tax opponents dub it a “death tax,” claim that it hurts business activity and job creation, 
and assert that its negative effects are thus felt by all households, including those that never pay 
the tax. For these reasons, they call for abolishing it. In contrast, its supporters see the estate tax 
as an effective way to tax the richest (and dead) few and redistribute. They also point out that the 
abolition of the “death tax” on a small set of rich people implies a “birth tax” on all citizens.
This paper measures the burden of effective estate taxation, and how it is distributed across 
the population using a quantitative, general equilibrium economy that explicitly studies entre-
preneurial entry, continuation decisions, investment and job creation, and transmission of estates 
across generations. While calibrated to match some other key aspects of the data, this framework 
matches the observed wealth inequality and wealth mobility for entrepreneurs and workers, and 
replicates the observed consumption inequality. The fact that such a simple model does that well 
along all of these dimensions helps us trust the policy implications that it generates.
This paper evaluates the effects of abolishing the estate tax under three alternative scenar-
ios, starting with the one that casts abolishing it under the most favorable light, all the way to 
the least benign one. These scenarios differ because of the distortions introduced by the other 
policy instruments used to reestablish fiscal balance. The first tax policy raises no other tax, but 
cuts wasteful government spending as a fraction of output. Alternatively, under the second and 
third tax policies, the government keeps government spending as a fixed fraction of output and 
increases either the tax on consumption or the one on total income. We compute the steady states 
before and after abolishing estate taxes, the transition path of the economy between steady states, 
and the implied welfare costs and benefits of each reform.
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Our model implies a large gap between the headline-making statutory numbers and the effec-
tive estate taxation. We find a large effective exemption level (about $5 million per household), 
and a fairly low effective marginal tax rate (16 percent). These findings are consistent with previ-
ous estimates (see William G. Gale, James R. Hines, and Joel Slemrod 2001 for an overview). 
Our effective exemption level reinforces previous arguments that the exemption level is high 
enough to imply that the impact of estate taxes on family farms and businesses is not a major 
concern for most estates (see, for example, Neil E. Harl 1995; Gale and Slemrod 2001).
We do find that the estate tax distorts the saving and investment decisions of the very rich, who 
also hold a large fraction of total wealth, thereby reducing aggregate output and savings.
These distortions do not necessarily imply that their abolition would increase welfare for 
everyone. The estate tax is highly progressive, and abolishing it does generate a large welfare 
gain for the super-rich. However, if another tax is raised to reestablish fiscal balance, most of the 
population experiences a welfare loss. Surprisingly, even when no other tax is raised, but waste-
ful government spending is cut as a fraction of output, someone experiences a welfare loss. In 
this case, the increased investment by the entrepreneurs drives down the interest rate, and the 
people who are not rich enough to benefit from the estate tax cut, but are rich enough to have the 
bulk of their income coming from capital rather than labor, are worse off.
Our results thus indicate that most households today would find it in their interest to oppose 
the more realistic reforms in which a consumption or income tax would be raised to compensate 
for decreased revenues from abolishing estate taxation. More generally, all of the policy experi-
ments that we consider contradict the claim that most households would benefit from abolishing 
estate taxation.
We also find that the aggregate effects of eliminating estate taxation crucially depend on what 
other tax instrument is used at the same time to reestablish fiscal balance. In the case in which, 
perhaps more realistically, the tax on total income were raised, the distortions coming from this 
small increase for all of the population erase almost all of the aggregate increase in total output 
coming from increased investment of the very rich who benefit from the elimination of the estate 
tax. In the cases in which either wasteful government spending is cut as a fraction of output, or 
the consumption tax is raised, aggregate output does increase. This comes from the classic fact 
that a tax on total income also hits capital income and distorts savings.
In none of the policy experiments do wealth and consumption inequality go up significantly as 
a result of the abolition of estate taxes.
Section I places this paper in the context of the previous work on entrepreneurship and taxa-
tion, while Section II provides a brief overview of estate taxation in the United States. Section 
III describes our model. Section IV discusses our calibration procedure. Section V evaluates 
the fit of our model against a number of important features of the data that we do not match by 
construction. Section VI evaluates the effects of abolishing estate taxation while using various 
instruments to reestablish fiscal balance, and Section VII concludes.
I. Previous Literature on Entrepreneurship
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that evaluates estate taxation reforms 
by using a quantitative, general equilibrium model that takes into account the effects of the 
reforms on the key channels that most worry legislators: wealth inequality, business activity, 
aggregate activity at large, and estate transmission. Our model also quantitatively matches a 
number of important features of the data, including wealth inequality.
Despite the relevance of estate taxation reform and its major impact on policy circles, few papers 
study this reform in the context of quantitative models capable of replicating the extreme con-
centration of wealth observed in the data. This is because constructing such a model,  computing 
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it, and calibrating it to the data are not easy tasks. (For discussions, see Vincenzo Quadrini and 
José Víctor Ríos Rull 1997a; Cagetti and De Nardi 2008; Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin 2007; 
Neng Wang 2007.)
Ana Castañeda, Javier Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos Rull (2003) and John Laitner (2001) are 
exceptions in that they study estate taxation in the context of quantitative models that are, to 
some extent, capable of replicating the extreme concentration of wealth observed in the data. 
Neither of these papers, however, models entrepreneurial business formation and the associated 
job creation and investment. Other academic contributions have shown that entrepreneurship and 
some kind of borrowing constraint are key determinants of investment, saving, wealth holdings, 
and wealth inequality (see Quadrini and Ríos Rull 1997b; Quadrini 1999, 2000; William Gentry 
and R. Glenn Hubbard 2004; and Cagetti and De Nardi 2006).
Previous literature has also argued that entrepreneurial capital accumulation is influenced 
by borrowing constraints both in developing economies (Francisco Buera 2008b; Hyeok Jeong 
and Robert M. Townsend, forthcoming; António Antunes, Tiago Cavalcanti, and Anne Villamil 
2008) and in developed ones (Gentry and Hubbard 2004; Buera 2008a; David G. Blanchflower 
2008; Alexander Monge-Naranjo 2008; Luis Carranza, José E. Galdón-Sánchez, and Jesús 
Fernández-Villaverde 2003).
Other works have studied the effect of income and capital taxation with explicit modeling 
of entrepreneurial decisions (e.g., Césaire Meh 2005; Sagiri Kitao 2008; Vasia Panousi 2008). 
Regarding other aspects of quantitative models of entrepreneurship and government policies, 
V. V. Chari, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinsky (2003) focus on the lock-in effect of capital 
gains taxes on entrepreneurial start-ups, Wenli Li (2002) studies the effects of government subsi-
dies, while Ahmet Akyol and Kartik Athreya (2008) and Meh and Yaz Terajima (2008) examine 
the effects of bankruptcy laws.
The framework developed in this paper builds on Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), enriching it 
by allowing the entrepreneurs to hire workers; by introducing progressive income and estate 
taxation, and proportional consumption taxation; and by computing the transition paths of the 
economy in response to tax changes.1
II. A Brief Overview of Estate Taxation in the United States
The revenues from the estate and gift tax and the fraction of estates that pay estate taxes are 
small. Only 2 percent of the estates of adult decedents pay any estate taxes and their revenue is 
about 0.3 percent of US output (see, for example, Gale and Slemrod 2001).
At a first glance, these revenues might seem at odds with the statutory numbers that we read 
in the newspaper headlines. Looking at the tax code in greater detail, one quickly gets the sense 
that effective taxation and headline-making statutory estate taxation are very different.
Here, we focus only on the features of both statutory and effective estate taxation that are 
most important given our purposes. Among the most recent literature Gale, Hines, and Slemrod 
(2001), Henry J. Aaron and Gale (1996), and Gale and Maria Perozek (2001) provide overviews 
and discussions on estate and gift taxation.
Federal law imposes an integrated set of taxes on estates, gifts, and generation-skipping trans-
fers. The gross estate includes all of the decedent’s assets. In the process of going from the gross 
1 See Juan Carlos Conesa and Dirk Krueger (2006) for an earlier example of computing the economy’s transition 
path in a Bewley model.
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estate to the net, taxable estate, here are some of the important steps (the specific numbers that 
we use here are based on the year 2000 tax code2):
 (i) The allowed estate tax implied exemption level was $675,000.
 (ii) Assets are typically evaluated at fair market value. Closely held businesses, however, are 
allowed to value real property assets at their “use value” rather than their highest alterna-
tive market-oriented value. The maximum allowed reduction in value is $770,000.
 (iii) In addition, it is often possible to discount asset values substantially when such assets are 
not readily marketable or the taxpayers’ ownership does not correlate with control.
 (iv) Interests in certain qualified family businesses were also allowed an extra deduction of 
up to $625,000 in 2000 for the value of the business being transferred.
 (v) One can apply unlimited deductions for transfers to a surviving spouse.
After determining the net estate, that is, the value of the gross estate less appropriate deduc-
tions, the statutory tax rate is applied. The “applicable credit amount” implied that in the year 
2000, at least the first $675,000 was not taxable. The marginal federal tax rate for a taxable 
return above that amount started at 37 percent and topped out at 55 percent.
Credit is given for state inheritance and estate taxes. Most states now levy “soak-up taxes” that 
shift revenues from the federal to the state treasuries without adding to the total tax burden on 
the estate.
By looking at the simple plan above, one can see that a rich couple could immediately double 
the standard exemption level just by leaving the children assets up to the deduction upon the 
death of the first decedent, and then applying the deduction a second time upon death of the 
other spouse. Gale and Slemrod (2001) argue that simply by using legal valuation techniques, 
exemptions, and various deductions, a couple with a $4 million dollar business could pass it to 
their heir without paying any estate taxes, and without having to engage in any complicated tax 
avoidance plan. They also argue that this threshold can be increased even further using other 
legal strategies.
Judicious application of valuation plans and the extra deduction for the presence of a family 
business further increase the exemption level and bring down the effective estate tax rate above 
the exemption level. Richard Schmalbeck (2001) describes many (legal) estate tax avoidance 
schemes and provides some measures of effective estate taxes after such plans are implemented. 
Aaron and Alicia Munnell (1992) and Wojciech Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) also argue that 
there are many ways to reduce effective estate taxation.
Eller, Brian Erard, and Chih-Chin Ho (2001) focus on tax noncompliance by using audit data. 
They find overall (illegal) estate tax evasion to be about 13 percent of the potential tax base.
Although many experts agree that effective estate taxation can be substantially lower than 
the statutory one, there is considerable uncertainty about how much people do reduce the effec-
tive estate tax burden (see Edward N. Wolff 1996; James M. Poterba 2000). Similarly, there is 
uncertainty about the effective progressivity of the estate tax and its exact exemption level. Some 
argue that it is easier to decrease the tax burden for smaller estates (which are also less likely to 
2 See Barry W. Johnson, Jakob Mikow, and Martha Britton Eller (2001) and W. Elliott Brownlee (2000) for a historic 
perspective on federal estate taxation.
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be audited). Others argue that, given the economies of scale for tax avoidance and evasion, the 
tax burden might actually be lower for larger estates.
We propose a complementary way to assess the burden of estate taxation. We assume a 
simple functional form for estate taxation that allows for an exemption level and a constant tax 
rate above such a level, and we use our model-generated data to match the fraction of estates 
paying estate taxes, and estate tax revenues as a fraction of output. Interestingly, we find num-
bers that fall well within the bounds proposed by the previous literature. Given that our model 
matches asset holdings so well for both entrepreneurs and workers, and given the considerable 
uncertainty about effective estate tax avoidance and evasion, we see this as a useful way to 
proceed.
Legislation passed in 2003 gradually decreases statutory marginal tax rates and gradually 
increases statutory exemption levels every year until 2010. In 2010, all estates are to be taxed at 0 
percent. In 2011, however, these temporary cuts are scheduled to vanish, and the statutory taxa-
tion schedule is to revert to much higher levels. Many interpret this path as compelling evidence 
that a reform is needed.
III. The Model
In this model, the households have heterogeneous ability as workers and entrepreneurs, they 
choose their occupation every period, and they care about the welfare of their offspring.
Since we compute the transition dynamics between the steady states corresponding to a given 
policy experiment, we make time subscripts explicit whenever relevant.
A. Demographics
We adopt a life-cycle model with intergenerational altruism. To reconcile the computational 
necessity of few stages of life and the realism of short time periods, we adopt a modeling device 
introduced by Olivier J. Blanchard (1985) and generalized by Mark Gertler (1999) to a life-cycle 
setting.
Our model period is one-year long. Households go through two stages of life, young and old 
age. A young person faces a constant probability of aging during each period 11 2 py 2 , and an 
old person faces a constant probability of dying during each period 11 2 po 2 . When an old person 
dies, his offspring enters the model, carrying the assets bequeathed to him by the parent.
Appropriately parameterized, this framework generates households for which the average 
length of the working period and the retirement period is realistic. There is a continuum of 
households of measure 1.
B. Preferences
The household’s flow of utility from consumption is given by ct
12s / 11 2 s2 . The households 
discount the future at rate b and are perfectly altruistic toward their descendants.
C. Technology
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exogenous, stochastic, posi-
tively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each other. Entrepreneurial ability 1ut 2 is the 
capacity to invest capital and labor more or less productively by using one’s own production 
function. Working ability 1 yt 2 is the capacity to produce income out of labor by working for 
others.
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At the beginning of each period the current ability levels are known with certainty, while next 
period’s levels are uncertain. A young individual starts the period with assets at , entrepreneurial 
ability ut , and worker ability yt, and chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker during 
the current period.
The entrepreneurs can borrow, invest capital, hire labor, and run a technology whose return 
depends on their own entrepreneurial ability. When the entrepreneur invests kt production net of 
depreciation, this is given by
(1)  f 1kt , nt 2 5 u 1ktg 11 1 nt 2 112g 2 2 n 1 11 2 d 2k,
where n, g [ 30, 14 , and n is hired labor 1n $ 02 . We normalize the labor of the entrepreneur 
to one. Entrepreneurs thus face decreasing returns from investment, as their managerial skills 
become gradually stretched over larger and larger projects (as in Robert E. Lucas, Jr. 1978).
Many firms are not controlled by a single entrepreneur and are not likely to face the same 
financing restrictions that we stress in our model. Therefore, as in Quadrini (2000), we model 
two sectors of production: one populated by the entrepreneurs and one by “nonentrepreneur-
ial” firms. The nonentrepreneurial sector is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function,
(2)  F 1Ktc, Ltc 2 5 A 1Ktc 2 a 1Ltc 212a 2 dKtc,
where Kt
c and Lt
c are the total capital and labor inputs in the nonentrepreneurial sector and A is a 
constant. In both sectors, capital depreciates at a rate d.
D. credit Markets
Workers can save, but not borrow, at a riskless rate of return. Entrepreneurs can borrow. Their 
borrowing constraints are endogenously determined in equilibrium and stem from the assump-
tions that contracts are imperfectly enforceable, as in Albert Marcet and Ramon Marimon (1992), 
Timothy J. Kehoe and David K. Levine (1993), Rui Albuquerque and Hugo A. Hopenhayn (2004), 
and Thomas Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004).
Imperfect enforceability of contracts means that the creditors will not be able to force the 
debtors to fully repay their debts as promised, and that the debtors fully repay only if it is in their 
interest to do so. Since both parties are aware of this feature and act rationally, the lender will 
lend to a given borrower an amount (possibly zero) that will be in the debtor’s interest to repay 
as promised.3
E. Government and Taxation
The government is infinitely lived. It levies taxes, pays a pension pt to each retiree, provides a 
certain level gt of public purchases (which do not enter the households’ utility function), and pays 
interest on the accumulated debt. During every period, tax revenues from income, consumption, 
and estate taxes are equal to government purchases, pension payments, and interest payments 
on the debt.
We model progressive taxation of total income (as in David Altig and Charles T. Carlstrom 
1999), and we allow the tax schedules to be different for entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs 
3 See Alexander Karaivanov, Anna Paulson, and Townsend (2008) for a discussion of different types of contract 
enforceability.
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(including workers and retirees). We adopt Miguel Gouveia and Robert P. Strauss’s (1994) func-
tional form and assume the average federal tax rate ti 1Yt 2 on total income Yt is given by
(3)  ti 1Yt 2 5 bi 2 bi 1siYtpi 1 1221 / pi,
where i 5 e, w: entrepreneurs and workers. Gouveia and Strauss (1994) have shown that this func-
tional form is flexible enough to approximate well the effective average tax rate. As explained 
in the calibration section, we estimate the parameters bi, si, and pi from microeconomic data, 
separately for entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs.
Total income taxes paid by each household are given by
(4)  Tt
i 1Yt 2 5 ti 1Yt 2 Yt 1 ttsYt ,
where tt
s captures state and other income taxes (other than federal). The government also levies 
a sales tax on consumption, at rate tt
c. Estates larger than a given value et are taxed at rate tt
b on 
the amount in excess of et . The tax rates tt
s, tt
c, and tt
b are potentially time-varying, depending 
on the policy experiment under consideration.
F. households
The Young’s Problem.—The value function of a young person is
(5)  Vt 1at, yt, ut 2 5 max 5Vte 1at, yt, ut 2 , Vtw 1at, yt, ut 2 6,
where Vt
e 1at, yt, ut 2 is the value function of a young individual who manages an entrepreneurial 
activity during the current period. The term Vt
w 1at, yt, ut 2 is the value function if he chooses to 
be a worker during the current period. Working capital kt includes own assets and borrowed 
money.
The young entrepreneur’s problem can be written as
(6)
  Vt
e 1at, yt, ut 2 5  max  5u 1ct 2 1 bpy EtVt111at11, yt11, ut112 1 b 11 2 py 2 EtWt111at11, ut112 6,
 ct, kt, nt, at11
subject to
(7)  Yt
e 5 u 1ktg 11 1 nt 2 112g 2 2 n 2 dkt 2 rt 1kt 2 at 2 2 wt nt,
(8)  at11 5 Yt
e 2 Tt
e 1Yte 2 1 at 2 11 1 ttc 2 ct,
(9)  u 1ct 2 1 bpy EtVt111at11, yt11, ut112 1 b 11 2 py 2 EtWt111at11, ut112 $ Vtw 1  f  kt, yt, ut 2 .
This constraint reflects the assumption that the entrepreneurs who borrow can either invest 
the money in their business and repay their debt at the end of the period, or can be workers for 
that period. In the latter case, the defaulting workers retain a fraction f of their working capital 
kt (which includes borrowed and own funds) and their creditors seize the rest. The lender will 
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rationally lend an amount such that the value of repaying and being an entrepreneur is no smaller 
than the value of defaulting and being a worker for this period:
(10)  at $ 0,
(11)  nt $ 0,
(12)  kt $ 0.
The term Yt
e represents the entrepreneur’s total profits. The expected value of the value func-
tion is taken with respect to 1 yt11, ut112 , conditional on 1 yt, ut 2 . Equation (9) determines the maxi-
mum amount that an entrepreneur with given state variables can borrow. The term Wt 1at11, ut112 
is the value function of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, before deciding 
whether to stay in business or retire. We have
(13)  V t 
w 1at, yt, ut 2 5  max  5u 1ct 2 1 bpy EtVt111at11, yt11, ut112 1 b 11 2 py 2W rt111at112 6,
 ct, at11
subject to equation (10) and
(14)  Y t
w 5 wt yt 1 rt at,
(15)  at11 5 11 1 rt 2at 2 Ttw 1Ytw 2 2 11 1 ttc 2 ct,
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate.
The Old’s Problem.—An old entrepreneur can decide to keep the activity going or retire, 
while a retiree cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity.
The old entrepreneur’s state variables are thus his current assets at and his entrepreneurial 
ability level ut. His value function is given by
(16)  Wt 1at, ut 2 5 max 5Wte 1at, ut 2 , Wtr 1at 2 6,
where Wt
e 1at, ut 2 is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in business, and Wtr 1at 2 
is the value function of the old retired person. Define the inherited assets, net of estate taxes, as 
ant11 5 at11 2 t 
b
t11 max 10, at11 2 et112 . We have
(17)  Wt
e 1at, ut 2 5  max  5u 1ct 2 1 bpo EtWt111at11, ut112 1 b 11 2 po 2 EtVt111ant11, yt11, ut112 6,
 ct, kt, nt, at11 
subject to equations (7), (8), (10), (11), and (12), and
(18)  u 1ct 2 1 bpo EtWt111at11, ut112 1 b 11 2 po 2EtVt111ant11, yt11, ut112 $ Wtr 1 f kt 2 .
This constraint reflects that the old entrepreneur’s alternatives are either to invest and repay the 
debt, or to run away with a fraction of the total working capital and be retired from that period on.
The child of an entrepreneur is born with ability level 1ut11, yt112 . The expected value of the 
child’s value function with respect to yt11 is computed using the invariant distribution of yt, while 
the one with respect to ut11 is conditional on the parent’s ut and evolves according to the same 
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Markov process that each person faces for ut while alive. This is justified by the assumption that 
the child of an entrepreneur inherits the parent’s firm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social security payments 1 pt 2 and consumes his assets. His value function is
(19)  Wt
r 1at 2 5  max  5u 1ct 2 1 bpoW rt111at112 1 b 11 2 po 2EtVt111a nt11, yt11, ut112 6, ct, at11 
subject to equation (10), and
(20)  at11 5 11 1 rt 2at 1 pt 2 Ttw 1 pt 1 rt at 2 2 11 1 ttc 2 ct.
The expected value of the child’s value function is taken with respect to the invariant distribution 
of yt and ut.
G. Equilibrium Definition
Let xt 5 1at, yt, ut, zt 2 be the individual’s state vector, where z distinguishes young people, old 
entrepreneurs, and old retirees. From the decision rules that solve the maximization problem and 
the exogenous Markov process for income and entrepreneurial ability, we can derive a transition 
function Mt 1xt, · 2 , which provides the probability distribution of xt11 (the state next period) con-
ditional on the current state xt.
At each time t an equilibrium is given by
 sequences of the risk free interest rates rt and wage rates wt,
 sequences of taxes 1Ttw 1 · 2 , Tte 1 · 2 , ttc, ttb, et 2 and social security payments pt , µ allocations ct 1x 2 , and occupational choices at 1x 2 ,
 entrepreneurial labor hiring nt 1x 2 , and investments kt 1x 2 , 
 and a distribution of people over the state variables xt: mt 1x 2 , 
such that, given the sequences of prices and government taxes and transfer schedules:
• The functions ct, at, nt, and kt solve the maximization problems described above.
• The capital and labor markets clear. Total labor supplied by the workers equals the total 
labor employed in the nonentrepreneurial sector and total labor hired by the entrepreneurs. 
Total household savings in the economy equal the sum of the total capital employed in the 
nonentrepreneurial and entrepreneurial sectors plus government debt.
• The marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital (net of depreciation) in 
the nonentrepreneurial sector are equal to wt and rt.
• The government budget is satisfied: total taxes collected plus net borrowing equal govern-
ment purchases, transfers, and interest payments on debt:
 31Ttx 1Yx2 1 ttcc 1x 2 1 Io 1x 2ttb 11 2 po 2 max 10, at111xt 2 2 et 2 2 dmt 1x 2
 5 ptpr 1 gt 1 11 1 rt 2Dt 2 Dt11.
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  The integral is over all of the population, Io is equal to one if the person is old and zero oth-
erwise, and pr is the fraction of retired persons in the population. In steady state Dt 5 D
–
.
•	 The	distribution	of	people	mt is induced by the transition matrix of the system as follows:
 m9t11 5 Mt 1xt, · 29 m9t .
 In steady state, mt 5 m* is the invariant distribution for the economy; debt, prices, and govern- 
ment policies are constant; and the individual’s decision rules are time-independent.
H. The Transition Path between Steady States
Our economy starts from an initial steady state in which there is estate taxation. Unexpectedly, 
the government abolishes estate taxes and makes up for the change in government revenues by 
varying either government spending as a fraction of output, or the consumption tax, or the pro-
portional part of the tax on total income.
When we use either the income tax or the consumption tax, we allow the government to adjust 
this policy instrument for ten years, and after this period the tax is set at its final steady-state 
level. The level of the tax during these years is determined by the requirement that the govern-
ment budget constraint has to be satisfied in present value. The shape of the tax change over this 
time period is constrained to be piecewise linear and continuous over two five-years subperiods. 
That is, during these ten years the government could, for example, raise the chosen tax instru-
ment for five years, and then lower it to its final steady-state value for the other five years. This 
gives us exactly one free parameter (the level of the tax rate after the first five years), which is 
used to balance the budget.
In these experiments, government purchases are kept fixed as a fraction of total output, both 
during the transition and in the final steady state. For all final steady states, we set government 
debt to be the same constant fraction of total capital as in the initial steady state.
When we change government spending as a result of the abolition of the estate tax, we keep 
all other tax rates fixed at their initial steady-state value, and we take government debt to be a 
constant fraction of capital also during the transition path. Budget balance for the government 
then implies how much government purchases are.
As soon as people learn about the new policy, households reoptimize their behavior, taking 
as given the new path of government policy and prices. Barring any other changes, the economy 
will eventually settle down on a final steady state as a result of the new tax code. During the 
intervening years, the economy will be in a transition. The transition will take longer than the 
period over which taxes change because the distribution of people over state variables will take a 
while to reach its steady-state level, and because of general equilibrium effects (prices will take 
a while to get close to their steady-state levels).
IV. Calibration of the Initial Steady State
Tables 1 and 2 list the parameters of the model. Table 1 lists the parameters that we take as 
given and do not use to match model-generated moments with moments in the data. Table 2 lists 
the parameters of the model that we choose so that the data generated by the initial steady state 
of the model match some relevant counterpart of the observed data.
Regarding the first set of parameters, we take the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be 1.5, 
a value close to those estimated by, among others, Orazio P. Attanasio et al. (1999). As is stan-
dard, we choose a depreciation rate d of 6 percent and the capital share in the  nonentrepreneurial 
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 production function of 0.33. The probability of aging 
and of death are such that the average length of the 
working life is 45 years and the average length of the 
retirement period is 11 years. This implies that the 
fraction of young people in the population is about 
80 percent. The logarithm of the income y process 
for working people is assumed to follow an AR(1). 
We take its persistence to be 0.95, as estimated by, 
for instance, Kjetil Storesletten, Chris Telmer, and 
Amir Yaron (1999). The variance is chosen to match 
the Gini coefficient for earnings of 0.38, the average 
found in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We assume that the income process and 
the entrepreneurial ability processes evolve independently; the exact values for the income and 
ability processes are described in Appendix A. The social security replacement rate is 40 percent 
of average gross income (see Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent Smetters, and Jan Walliser 1999).
We set the ratio of g to output at 18.7 percent. This was the average ratio of government pur-
chases to GDP over the 1990–1999 period (Economic Report of the President 2000).
As in David Altig et al. (2001), we take the tax rate on consumption to be 11 percent. The ratio 
of total indirect taxes to personal consumption expenditure in the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) has been quite stable, at around 11–12 percent from 1989 to 1999.
We pick the level of government debt (as a fraction of output) so that, in the initial steady state, 
total interest payments on government debt equal 3 percent of output (as in Altig et al. 2001).
We estimate the parameters of the tax function on total income using PSID data for 1989 (see 
Appendix B for details). Figure 1 displays our estimated average tax rates as a function of total 
income for the whole population and for the subpopulations of entrepreneurs and workers.
There are many people who call themselves self-employed but who are not entrepreneurs in 
the spirit of our model. We use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to identify the  empirical 
Table 1—Fixed Parameters and Their Sources
Parameter Value Source(s)
Preferences, technology, and demographics
 s 1.5 Attanasio et al. (1999)
 d 0.06 Nancy L. Stokey and Sergio Rebelo (1995)
 a 0.33 Douglas Gollin (2002)
 A 1 Normalization
 py 0.98 Average working life: 45 years
 po 0.91 Average retirement life: 11 years
Labor income process and  
social security payments
 y, Py See Appendix A Mark Huggett (1996), Lee A. Lillard and 
Robert J. Willis (1978)
 p 40 percent average yearly income Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1999)
Public purchases, government debt, and taxes
 g 18.7 percent GDP Economic Report of the President (2000)
 D see text Altig et al. (2001)
 tc 11 percent Altig et al. (2001)
 bw 0.32 Our estimates
 be 0.26 Our estimates
 sw 0.22 Our estimates
 pw 0.76 Our estimates
 pe 1.4 Our estimates
 se 0.42 Our estimates
Table 2—Calibrated Parameters
Calibrated parameter Value
b 0.9
u 50, 0.66
Pu see text
n 0.88
g 0.84
f 0.75
tb 0.16
e 120
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counterpart of our entrepreneurs as the self-employed business owners who actively manage 
their own firm(s). See Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) for a discussion of the various empirical 
counterparts to the notion of entrepreneurship.
Table 2 lists the remaining parameters of the model and their corresponding values in the 
baseline calibration. We consider only two values of entrepreneurial ability—zero (no entrepre-
neurial ability) and a positive number—for two reasons. The first is that, as we will see, the rich 
endogenous heterogeneity generated by our parsimonious calibration does fit many important 
aspects of the data extremely well. The second is due to computational running time: computing 
a general equilibrium steady state with one exogenous entrepreneurial ability level takes several 
days on a state-of-the-art computer and with Fortran coding, due the nature of the borrowing 
constraints.
Our choice on the number of exogenous entrepreneurial ability levels implies that Pu is a two-
by-two matrix. Since its rows have to sum to one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate. We 
also have to choose values for n, the degree of decreasing returns to scale to entrepreneurial abil-
ity, g, the share of income going to entrepreneurial working capital,  f, the fraction of working 
capital the entrepreneur can keep in case he defaults, the estate tax rate, and its corresponding 
exemption level.
There are thus nine parameters to use to match nine moments of the data. We target the fol-
lowing moments: the capital-output ratio (3.0), the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population (7.6 
percent), the fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship during each period (22 percent), 
the fraction of workers becoming entrepreneurs during each period (2.3 percent),4 the ratio of 
median net worth of entrepreneurs to that of workers (6.5–7 percent), the fraction of people with 
4 Both in the model and in the data, entry and exit rates refer only to people who were in the model (or survey) in both 
periods and transitioned from one occupation to the other; they do not include people who die while running an enterprise, 
nor people who start their enterprise at the beginning of their economic life. For this reason, entry, exit, and the steady-
state fraction of entrepreneurs are not linked by the identity that would hold in an economy with infinitely lived agents.
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zero wealth (7–13 percent), the fraction of entrepreneurs hiring workers on the labor market 
(50–60 percent), the revenue from estate and gift taxes (0.3 percent of output), and the fraction of 
the estates that pay estate taxes (2 percent).
Our calibration matches all of our targets well. Appendix C reports some sensitivity analysis 
about two key parameters of the entrepreneurial production function, n and g, and shows the 
effects of allowing no intergenerational transmission of ability between parent entrepreneurs and 
their children.
Our calibration strategy uses our framework to provide a measure of effective estate taxation 
by using the fraction of estates that pay estate taxes to determine the effective exemption level, 
and the ratio of aggregate estate taxes to output to determine the tax rate above the exemption 
level. These parameters are pinned down given the underlying distribution of wealth generated 
by the model. Given that our model provides such a good fit of observed net worth holdings, 
we argue that this is a good way to measure effective estate taxation. We find that the current 
statutory estate taxation code implies a large effective exemption level (about 5 million dollars 
per household), and a fairly low effective marginal tax rate (16 percent). These numbers are 
consistent with people rationally using legal exemptions, special provisions, and favorable valu-
ation methods to lower the estate tax burden, and with previous estimates (for an overview, see 
Gale, Hines, and Slemrod 2001). They are also consistent with previous arguments according 
to which the exemption level is high enough to imply that the impact of estate taxes on family 
farms and businesses is not a major concern for most estates (see, for example, Harl 1995; Gale 
and Slemrod 2001).
V. Results: Evaluating Our Model-Generated Data against the Actual Data
We now compare some important features of the actual data for the US economy with the 
corresponding features of our model-generated data. A good fit of the model to aspects of the 
data that were not matched by construction in our calibration procedure increases our faith in the 
policy projections generated by the model.
A. Wealth Distribution
Table 3 compares some data for the US economy (from the 1989 SCF; the data from other 
years are similar) and for the model-generated data, and Figures 2 and 3 compare the wealth 
distribution for the same US data and for the model, respectively, for the whole population and 
for the subpopulation of entrepreneurs.
Our framework with entrepreneurial choice fits the observed wealth distribution very well, 
both for the whole population, and for the subpopulation of the entrepreneurs. Cagetti and 
De Nardi (2006) discuss the role of entrepreneurship in shaping wealth concentration, the rela-
tionship between borrowing constraints and entrepreneurial entry, and entrepreneurial returns.
Table 3—Baseline Calibration
Percentage of wealth held by top
Wealth
Gini 1 percent 5 percent 20 percent 40 percent
US data 0.78 30 54 81 95
Model 0.82 30 60 85 95
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B. Wealth Mobility
To evaluate the policy implications of the model, it is also important to evaluate whether the 
dynamics of the model are consistent with those in the observed data. We evaluate here the rela-
tionship between wealth mobility and occupational choice.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Entrepreneurs’ Wealth
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Unfortunately the SCF, which is the dataset specifically designed to study the wealth and 
behavior of the wealthy (see Cagetti and De Nardi 2008) does not have much of a panel dimen-
sion. Hence, we use data from the wealth supplement of the PSID, which are available every five 
years. We report the transition dynamics for the 1989–1995 period (the results from the other 
years look similar).
Following Quadrini (1999, 2000), we separately compute net worth terciles for all of the sam-
ple. We then divide the sample as follows: workers who remain workers, workers who become 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs who remain entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs who switch to being 
workers. For each of these subcategories we compute wealth mobility across the worth terciles.
Table 4 reports both the results and the number of observations corresponding to each cell. 
These numbers highlight that some of the transition matrices are based on a small number of 
observations, so their interpretation requires caution.
This said, the transition matrices indicate more upward mobility in wealth for the entrepre-
neurs who stay entrepreneurs than for the workers who stay workers. Although the mobility 
matrices off the main diagonal (workers to entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs to workers) are 
based on a very small sample size, they seem to broadly indicate that the workers who become 
entrepreneurs are more upwardly mobile than those who remain workers, and that the entre-
preneurs who switch to being workers are more downwardly mobile than those who remain 
entrepreneurs.
We compute the analogous occupation and wealth mobility transition matrix generated by our 
model (also over a five-year period). The results are in Table 5. The transition matrices estimated 
using our model include all of the population, and therefore do not have the small-sample prob-
lem. This table shows that our model matches extremely well the wealth transitions of the work-
ers to workers (the one for which the PSID has more observations), and that it also matches quite 
well the important patterns of the PSID data that we have discussed above, such as more upward 
mobility for the entrepreneurs, and for the workers who become entrepreneurs.
Table 4—Wealth Mobility: Data from the PSID, 1989 to 1994
PSID data
Staying workers Switching workers
0.79 0.18 0.03 0.47 0.44 0.08
0.21 0.64 0.15 0.04 0.42 0.54
0.02 0.23 0.75 0.00 0.23 0.77
Observations for each cell
661 148  29 17 16  3
163 507 115  1 11 14
 16 135 440  0  3 10
Switching entrepreneurs Staying entrepreneurs
0.75 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.17
0.20 0.70 0.10 0.21 0.51 0.28
0.06 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.07 0.91
Observations for each cell
6 2  0 6  4   2
2 7  1 9 22  12
2 9 20 3 10 138
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In a previous working paper version, we have also documented that our model matches well 
observed consumption inequality. See Cagetti and De Nardi (2007) for this discussion and com-
parisons of the model-generated consumption inequality and the one in the observed US data.
VI. Abolishing Estate Taxation
We now turn to the effects of abolishing estate taxes. Every experiment first compares steady 
states and then computes welfare along the complete transition path.
A. Abolishing Estate Taxation and Adjusting Government Purchases
Government purchases are wasteful in this framework. It is therefore not surprising that cut-
ting a distortionary tax at the expense of government purchases raises total output and capital 
(Table 6, row 2). The interesting finding here is that the effects are substantial when compared to 
the small revenue coming from the estate tax. The elimination of the estate tax increases output 
by a factor of four times the revenue raised by the estate tax, and raises capital by at least a fac-
tor of eight. Interestingly, abolishing estate taxation changes long-run consumption and wealth 
inequality very little.
Abolishing estate taxation especially increases the return to saving for rich and old entrepre-
neurs, and benefits newborn entrepreneurs, who inherit larger estates and can run larger firms 
and make money more quickly as a result. More funds in the economy are thus invested in 
the more productive technology: the entrepreneurial one. This increase in investment is further 
amplified by the reduction in the interest rate, which represents the opportunity cost of funds for 
the entrepreneurs. This price change benefits all of the entrepreneurs.
Table 5—Wealth Mobility: Model, Five-Year Transitions
Staying workers Switching workers
0.76 0.23 0.01 0.16 0.60 0.24
0.22 0.58 0.20 0.01 0.28 0.71
0.00 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.99
Switching entrepreneurs Staying entrepreneurs
0.38 0.45 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.83
0.08 0.42 0.50 0.02 0.08 0.92
0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.99
Table 6—Abolishing the Estate Tax and Adjusting Another Policy Instrument, Comparing Initial and 
Final Steady States
Percentage wealth held by top
K Y Interest rate Percentage entrepreneurs 1 percent 5 percent 10 percent 20 percent
Benchmark economy
9.02 3.00 3.33 7.6 29.5 59.5 73.6 85.4
No estate tax, lower g/Y
12.4% 11.3% 3.14 7.6 30.5 60.6 74.2 85.8
No estate tax, higher tc
12.7% 11.4% 3.12 7.6 30.5 60.6 74.2 85.8
No estate tax, higher ts
10.8% 10.1% 3.22 7.6 30.4 60.3 74.0 85.7
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Despite the resulting increases in investment, capital, and output, the government has to cut gov-
ernment purchases as a fraction of output to reestablish fiscal balance. However, while the revenue 
from estate taxes in the initial steady state is 0.3 percent of output, the government has to cut spend-
ing by only 0.05 percent as a fraction of output (with respect to the initial steady state) because of 
the increase in output (and thus tax revenues) generated by the abolition of estate taxes.
Figure 4 plots the path of total capital in the economy, from the initial steady state to the final 
steady state of the economy. When the estate tax is eliminated but no other tax is changed, total 
capital increases for about 50 years. Aggregate output follows a very similar path.
Figures 5 and 6 display the welfare gains and losses for this reform. The welfare costs and 
benefits are expressed in terms of the fraction of consumption needed to have someone indif-
ferent between the new and the old tax system, taking the whole transition path into account. 
Positive numbers indicate gains from the tax reform. The horizontal axis represents one’s net 
worth at the moment the reform is announced. The solid line is the cumulative distribution of 
either young or old people at the time of the announcement of the reform. The scale for this vari-
able is on the right-hand side of the graph. The other two lines display the welfare gain or loss 
for a person with a middle ability level as a worker and, respectively, the lowest ability level as 
an entrepreneur (dashed line) and the highest ability level as an entrepreneur (dash-dot line). For 
all policy experiments, the welfare costs and benefits for workers of other ability levels are very 
similar to the ones reported.
Who gains and who loses from this reform?
Those who are very rich, and especially the old among them, benefit. The old people at the 
top of the wealth distribution experience a consumption gain of 7 percent, while the gain of their 
young counterparts is less than 1 percent. This is because the old are much closer to leaving a 
bequest, and thus value the estate tax break more. The young whose net worth is below $500,000 
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gain because of the increase in wages resulting from more aggregate capital accumulation. For 
them, wage income makes up for most of total income.
The losers are the young who are not poor enough and not rich enough: those whose net worth 
is above $500,000, but below $10 million or $20 million (depending on their entrepreneurial 
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Figure 5. Initial Young’s Welfare Gains of Eliminating Estate Taxes and Changing 
No Other Tax
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Figure 6. Initial Old’s Welfare Gains of Eliminating Estate Taxes and Changing No 
Other Tax
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ability level). This is because capital income makes up for a large share of their total income, 
and the interest rate drops as a result of this reform.5 Similarly, the old with low entrepreneurial 
ability and assets above $1 million, but below $7 million, are hurt by the decrease in the interest 
rate. They also do not benefit from the estate tax break, given that they were below the effective 
exemption level, or close to it, before the reform took place.
The cumulative distribution of either the young or the old shows that almost 80 percent of the 
young and over 90 percent of the old benefit from this reform. The young make up for 80 percent 
of the population. The average welfare gain from this reform is on the order of 0.2 percent of 
yearly consumption.
B. Abolishing Estate Taxation while Adjusting the consumption Tax
The consumption tax hike needed to balance the government budget constraint in the final 
steady state is small: this tax increases from 11 percent to 11.3 percent. Table 6 shows that the 
long-run effects of this reform are very similar to those in the reform in which no other taxes 
are raised. Capital and output increase by similar amounts and wealth inequality changes little. 
The fraction of entrepreneurs also remains unchanged. There is little change in consumption 
inequality as well.
Figure 7 plots the implied path of the tax rate on consumption over time. During the transi-
tion period the consumption tax peaks slightly above 11.5 percent before declining to its final 
steady-state level of 11.3 percent. Figure 8 highlights that capital overshoots its final steady-state 
level slightly during the transition, but that 50 years after the policy reform has taken place the 
5 Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz (2005) document a similar redistribution from interest rate changes fol-
lowing credit market reforms.
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majority of the transition in capital accumulation has occurred. Aggregate output behaves simi-
larly to aggregate capital. 
Figures 9 and 10 report the consumption compensations for this reform. Most people lose 
from switching to this tax system: they are not rich enough to benefit from the estate tax break, 
and they have to pay higher consumption taxes. A young person has to own at least $15–20 mil-
lion (depending on their entrepreneurial ability) to benefit from the tax reform, and even for the 
very richest young people the benefits are small. Many of the elderly are also hurt by the reform, 
given that they must hold $4–10 million (depending on the ability level) to benefit from the tax 
reform. The costs, for those incurring them, are under 1 percent of yearly consumption. The 
benefits for the very rich are large, of the order of 7 percent of yearly consumption. Since most 
people incur small losses, the average welfare cost from this reform is on the order of 0.3 percent 
of consumption.
C. Abolishing Estate Taxation while Adjusting the Proportional Income Tax
To balance the government budget constraint, the proportional part of the income tax increases 
from 3.6 percent to 4.0 percent. This change not only affects all of the households in the econ-
omy, but also decreases the return (net of taxes) from investing in capital for the entrepreneurs. 
The entrepreneurs hit more harshly by this tax increase are most of the young ones (for which 
the expected time of death is still far in the future, and for whom the benefits from the elimina-
tion of the estate tax are small) and the old ones who are not rich enough to benefit from the 
abolition of the estate tax. As a result, there is only a very small increase in output with respect 
to the initial steady state, and the aggregate gains are much smaller compared to the ones in the 
previous two reforms.
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The long-run effects of this policy on consumption and wealth inequality are very modest, as 
in all of the other policies that we have considered.
The consumption compensations required by this reform are similar to the ones that we 
reported when the consumption tax is raised. As in that policy, increasing the income tax to make 
up for lost revenues from the estate tax implies small welfare losses for most of the  population. 
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Figure 9. Welfare Gains for the Initial Young when Eliminating Estate Taxes and 
Increasing Consumpion Taxes
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Figure 10. Welfare Gains for the Initial Old when Elminating Estate Taxes and 
Increasing Consumption Taxes
MARch 2009106 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
The average welfare cost for this reform is on the same order of magnitude as when the consump-
tion tax is raised. As in the reform with an increase in the consumption tax, this reform has a 
bigger effect on the welfare of the old and redistributes from most people to a small fraction of 
rich people.
As one could have expected, this is the tax reform that casts estate taxation reform under the 
least favorable light among the experiments we consider. It is, however, the most plausible adjust-
ment to expect.
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos Rull (2003) analyze the effects of a similar reform in a 
model with no entrepreneurial choice, in which the key force driving wealth inequality is that 
the rich are subject to very large idiosyncratic earnings shocks (which are calibrated to match 
inequality in wealth holdings). As in our model, they find that the abolition of the estate tax 
generates only a small increase in wealth inequality. Compared to us, they obtain a long-run 
aggregate increase of 0.4 percent for output, which is four times larger than what we obtain, and 
a somewhat larger effect on total capital accumulation (0.87 percent compared to 0.78 percent). 
The additional channel at work in our framework is the disincentive effect on entrepreneurial 
investment due to the higher income tax. Since in our framework the entrepreneurial technology 
is much more productive than the nonentrepreneurial one, smaller investment by the entrepre-
neurs results in much lower aggregate income than smaller investment by the workers.
Laitner (2001) also studies the effects of a similar reform. He adopts a more stylized economy 
in which some households are altruistic while others do not care about their descendants. His 
main message is that, in his framework, abolishing the estate tax generates a significant increase 
in the share of total net worth held by the richest 1 percent, while the effects on the aggregates 
are relatively small for most parameterizations, but can be positive or negative depending on the 
fraction of altruistic households.
VII. Conclusions
We consider three different policy reforms that abolish estate taxation. Surprisingly, even the 
reform that was designed to be most favorable to the elimination of estate taxation (one in which 
no other tax is raised and wasteful government spending is cut as a fraction of output) generates 
welfare costs for some of the population. In this experiment, these costs could be traded off with 
the gains for the rest of the population and increased total output and capital. It should be noted, 
however, that this experiment is not very realistic: it is unlikely that government spending is com-
pletely wasteful, and it is likely politically difficult to cut it as a fraction of total output.
More realistic experiments increase either the consumption tax or the income tax to reestab-
lish fiscal balance. These taxes are obviously distorting and cast the repeal of estate taxation in a 
less favorable light. This is particularly true in the income tax case, which hits capital income as 
well, and thus has a significantly negative effect on entrepreneurial saving and investment. As a 
result of a necessary tax hike in either consumption or total income, both experiments generate 
welfare costs for much of the population. While increasing the consumption tax at least preserves 
almost all of the aggregate increases in aggregate output and capital, increasing the income tax 
wipes out much of these aggregate gains.
We find that none of these reforms would increase wealth or consumption inequality 
significantly.
It should also be noted that there might be features of reality that could provide additional 
reasons to abolish or reduce estate taxation. For example, our model does not consider tax avoid-
ance costs. Significant amounts of resources might be spent to decrease the tax burden, through 
the use of lawyers and accountants. The cost of tax avoidance might generate a deadweight loss 
that should be considered in the overall evaluation of any change in the estate tax. (See Aaron 
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and Munnell (1992) and Schmalbeck (2001) for a discussion of the avoidance costs.) This is an 
important and, to a large extent, unexplored issue that we leave for future research.
Appendix A: Income and Entrepreneurial Ability
The income process is an AR(1), and we approximate it with a five-point discrete Markov 
chain as in George Tauchen and Robert Hussey (1991). The grid points y for the income process 
(normalized to 1) that we use are C 0.2468 0.4473 0.7654 1.3097 2.3742 D
and the transition matrix Py is
 0.7376 0.2473 0.0150 0.0002 0.0000
 0.1947 0.5555 0.2328 0.0169 0.0001 s 0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113 t .
 0.0001 0.0169 0.2328 0.5555 0.1947
 0.0000 0.0002 0.0150 0.2473  0.7376
The transition matrix Pu is given by
 0.97 0.03 s 0.2 0.8 t .
Appendix B: Federal Tax Schedules
We estimate equation (2) using nonlinear least squares. The data are for 1989 and are taken 
from the PSID. This dataset asks questions that allow us to classify households as entrepreneurs 
and nonentrepreneurs, and, until 1989, it also provides computed data on total taxes paid by the 
respondents.
Our measure of total monetary income includes all forms of labor income, capital income, 
transfers, and income from entrepreneurial activities. Total federal taxes paid is the variable 
computed in the PSID (in our case, V18862 in the 1990 file). The dependent variable in the 
regression, average tax rate, is the ratio of federal taxes paid to total monetary income.
To obtain a representative sample, we exclude the 
poverty and Latino samples. To obtain the appropriate 
tax rate for our model (in which the lowest income level 
is positive), we also drop all observations with income 
smaller than $1,000 or negative taxes paid. To make the 
data on entrepreneurs consistent with those that we use 
from the SCF dataset and the model we employ, we define 
as entrepreneurs those who declare themselves to be self-
employed and own or have a financial interest in a busi-
ness activity. The resulting sample of entrepreneurs has 
very similar characteristics to those from the SCF. Our 
estimates would be very similar if we were to assume a 
somewhat smaller or larger cutoff for the amount of busi-
ness income received during the period.
Table 7—Estimates for the Federal 
Average Tax Rates
Parameter Point estimate
Whole sample
 b 0.30
 p 0.82
 s 0.24
Workers only
 bw 0.32
 pw 0.76
 sw 0.22
Entrepreneurs only
 be 0.26
 pe 1.40
 se 0.42
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We perform the estimation on three samples: the whole population of households, includ-
ing workers and entrepreneurs, the subpopulation of workers only, and the subpopulation of 
entrepreneurs only. The estimated values for the three groups are shown in Table 7 and plotted 
in Figure 1.
Appendix C: Some Sensitivity Analysis
This section displays sensitivity analysis for two parameters governing the entrepreneurial 
production function and for the transmission of ability from entrepreneurial parents to their 
offspring. The first two sensitivity checks are meant to question whether a different calibration 
of the entrepreneurial production function could have matched the moments that we want to 
hit. The last check, instead, is meant to reassure us that our results are reasonably robust to our 
assumed degree of intergenerational transmission of ability.
All of these checks fix prices and taxes at their equilibrium value in the initial steady state, and 
change one or two parameters of interest in each column.
The first column of Table 8 first reports the nine moments that our baseline model matches by 
construction and then reports two other important moments generated by our model. The second 
column reports the values of each moment for our baseline calibration.
The third column of the table lowers the degree of returns to scale to the entrepreneurial pro-
duction function. The fourth column of the table also lowers the parameter g.
The first two sensitivity checks show that these two parameters mainly affect the fraction of entre-
preneurs who hire on the labor market, and the ratio of the median net of entrepreneurs to the median 
net worth of workers. These checks show that two such moments are quite sensitive to the param-
eters of the entrepreneurial production function, allowing us to pin them down fairly precisely.
The interaction between these two parameters is not trivial. A high n is necessary to generate a 
large enough ratio of the median net worth of entrepreneurs to the one of the workers. This hap-
pens because the parameter n affects optimal firm size in terms of invested capital and, in presence 
of borrowing constraints, a larger optimal firm size increases median and average wealth holding 
by entrepreneurs (who use their own wealth to invest in their business and as collateral for their 
business).
When the entrepreneur can use both capital and labor, for given n, g affects both the degree of 
decreasing returns to capital (hence optimal firm size) and the optimal mix of capital and hired 
labor.
The last column of the table checks the sensitivity of our results to the degree of intergenera-
tional transmission of ability between parent entrepreneurs and their offspring. In our baseline 
calibration, we did not pick this parameter to match any moment of the data, but we simply 
assumed it to be the same as the persistence of entrepreneurial ability over one’s life.
To check the effects of this assumption, the last column of the table assumes the opposite, 
extreme, view that there is no intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurial ability. This col-
umn shows that our calibration does not crucially depend on this assumption.
The last two rows of the table show two important moments that we do not match by construc-
tion: the fraction of total net worth held by entrepreneurs, and the fraction of net worth held by 
the richest 1 percent of people in the population. These two lines show that all of these sensitivity 
checks lower the amount of wealth held by entrepreneurs in a counterfactual way (if anything, 
the baseline calibration underestimates this moment), and they also lower wealth concentration. 
The implied reduction of wealth concentration explains why in all of these checks we obtain 
reduced revenues from estate taxes and the fraction of estates that pay taxes. This observation 
confirms the importance of a good match of inequality in wealth holdings to estimate effective 
estate taxation and to study the effects of reforming this tax. 
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